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Abstract Opt-out systems of postmortem organ procurement are often supposed
to be justiﬁable by presumed consent, but this justiﬁcation turns out to depend on a
mistaken mental state conception of consent. A promising alternative justiﬁcation
appeals to the analogical situation that occurs when an emergency decision has to be
made about medical treatment for a patient who is unable to give or withhold his
consent. In such cases, the decision should be made in the best interests of the
patient. The analogous suggestion to be considered, then, is, if the potential donor
has not registered either his willingness or his refusal to donate, the probabilities
that he would or would not have preferred the removal of his organs need to be
weighed. And in some actual cases the probability of the ﬁrst alternative may be
greater. This article considers whether the analogy to which this argument appeals is
cogent, and concludes that there are important differences between the emergency
and the organ removal cases, both as regards the nature of the interests involved and
the nature of the right not to be treated without one’s consent. Rather, if opt-out
systems are to be justiﬁed, the needs of patients with organ failure and/or the
possibility of tacit consent should be considered.
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Introduction
Legal systems of the procurement of postmortem organs for transplantation are
usually classiﬁed into opt-in and opt-out systems. Systems of both types aim to
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-011-9182-0respect the decision of the deceased person, whether her decision was to donate, to
refuse donation, or to hand over the decision to her relatives (or to some other
person). The basic difference between these systems of organ procurement concerns
what they take to be the default when the deceased did not make any decision at all.
In pure opt-in systems the default is that no removal of organs will take place; in
opt-out systems, the default is that it will take place. In the systems commonly
known as opt-in systems, however, the actual default is that the decision will be
made by the family of the deceased. Hence, a threefold classiﬁcation would be more
accurate than the present one.
It is usually supposed that opt-out systems tend to have better results in terms of
organs becoming available for transplantation than opt-in systems, even the
imperfect opt-in systems. This is a complex and contested issue, which I cannot
enter into in this article.
1 My own middle-of-the-road view is that a legal opt-out
system can be an important part of a package, with other elements of the package,
such as the identiﬁcation of potential donors and the method of approaching their
relatives postmortem, being (at least) as important; this package, as a whole, tends
to have better results. The legal system is important because in decision-making,
people generally tend to keep to the default, whatever it is, unless they have clear
and unambiguous reasons to deviate from it [4–6]. This is true both for people
considering whether to register a decision to donate or a refusal of donation and for
their surrogates when they are being asked to decide in cases in which the deceased
did not make a decision.
Even recognizing this advantage, however, legislative majorities in many
jurisdictions have refused to introduce an opt-out system. The main objection to opt-
out systems has always been that in such systems it is possible for people to have
their organs removed after their death without their consent or even against their
wishes. Oddly enough, people who voice this objection usually fail to observe that it
applies equally to the actual opt-in systems they prefer, because in such systems, the
default is not that no removal of the organs will take place but that the family will
decide whether it will or not. If in such a case the family decides to consent to
removal, this is done without consent of the deceased and possibly against his
wishes. Nevertheless, the objection to opt-out systems should be taken seriously. Is
it possible to defend opt-out systems against it?
I will assume without further argumentation that the requirement of consent
follows from a right of people to make decisions about the way other people may act
with respect to their bodies, both before and after their death. An obvious way of
defending opt-out systems is to note that this right is limited. The ways to dispose of
a corpse before it starts decaying are essentially limited to burial or cremation. This
limitation is primarily justiﬁed by the harm principle: having corpses lying around is
a threat to public health.
2 But it is also usually assumed that the state is authorized to
command autopsies without the consent of the deceased or his relatives in the
interests of other people. It could be argued along similar lines that the interests of
1 The better results of opt-out systems have been disputed; see, e.g., [1–3].
2 Some limits may rather be motivated by considerations of human dignity, e.g., the prohibition against
feeding one’s dead body to the tigers in the zoo.
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his death for the ends of transplantation. I will not consider this possible justiﬁcation
in this article.
Probably the best-known way to justify opt-out systems is by reference to the
presumed consent of the deceased; in the English-speaking world ‘‘presumed
consent’’ is almost a proper name for such systems. Presuming someone’s consent
appears to mean holding him to have consented in the absence of compelling
evidence that he actually has [7]. The usual reason provided for assuming consent is
that the system can err on both sides (by removing the organs of someone who did
not consent or by not removing the organs of someone who did) and that the
probability of the second error is the greater. However, this view depends on the
equation of ‘‘consent’’ with a mental state of desire or preference. The requirement
of consent in that case is implied by a principle of maximizing the satisfaction of
people’s interests, broadly conceived as the fulﬁlment of their preferences. But if a
person has the right to decide about the fate of her own body, that means that her
decisions are authoritative and, therefore, preempt other people’s weighing of her
interests. By consenting or refusing to consent, she does not merely reveal her
preference but exercises her authority. Consent, in this context and similar ones,
therefore, does not refer to a mental state, but to a public act with normative
consequences. Hence, the common criticism of presumed consent is correct: by its
nature the requirement of consent can only be fulﬁlled by compelling evidence that
it actually has been given. Probabilistic evidence that a person would have preferred
to donate is not enough.
3
In this article, I want to consider another possible justiﬁcation of opt-out systems.
According to this alternative argument, we should act on our judgment of the best
interests of the deceased directly, without masquerading this judgment as an appeal
to presumed consent. In this enterprise, there really is no safe side to err on: it is
deplorable that one person’s organs are left unused when he preferred to donate
them, and it is equally so that another person’s organs are removed when he did not
want to donate them. So one is justiﬁed in considering which of these two
alternatives is the most probable one.
But how can acting in the interests of the deceased without his consent be
compatible with his authority over his dead body? The suggestion to be considered
is that the requirement of consent only applies when certain important conditions
have been satisﬁed, but these conditions cannot be satisﬁed when the decision about
organ removal has to be made and the deceased has not exercised his authority-
right, either by consenting or by refusing.
4
Why am I interested in this possible justiﬁcation? In the ﬁrst place, it has been
ably advocated in the literature.
5 More importantly, it seems to be the most
promising way to defend opt-out systems against the objection that they fail to
satisfy the requirement of consent. It is certainly far more plausible than a
3 I have elaborated on this argument in [8].
4 A ﬁnal possible justiﬁcation of at least some opt-out systems is an appeal to tacit consent, on the
assumption that it can be a species of actual and genuine, not merely presumed, consent [9].
5 See, e.g., David Price [10, Chap. 5] and Martin Wilkinson [11].
In the best interests of the deceased 261
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legislative authorities usually appeal to the fact that, in surveys, 80–90% of the
population testify to a positive attitude concerning postmortem organ donation, and
this is taken to show a preference for donation.
6 If such preferences cannot be
interpreted as constituting consent, maybe they can be appealed to directly.
Appealing to the best interests of the patient
In opt-out systems, organs are routinely removed from people’s dead bodies without
their consent. Critics often conclude that if people’s right to make authoritative
decisions about their own bodies implies that consent is required, that right is being
frequently infringed. On the view I want to consider, that conclusion does not
follow. Suppose that the holder of any authority-right is disabled, temporarily or
permanently, and cannot exercise the right to give consent; suppose also that she has
not given consent in advance before being disabled. What should we say? The
present case—let me call it the organ removal case—is of this kind: if we only take
into account moral considerations regarding the rights and interests of the deceased,
it is clear that if she had registered a valid consent before she died, we would be
allowed to proceed, and if she had registered a refusal, we would not. But what if
she registered neither consent nor refusal?
In such cases, there are two options. We could hold that we should now directly
consider the person’s interests because they cannot be represented by her own
authority. If this leads us to the removal of the deceased’s organs, lawyers may even
say that we acted on ‘‘imputed consent,’’ meaning that even if consent was lacking,
we were justiﬁed in acting as if the person had consented because, on justiﬁcatory
grounds, the person’s best interests were as good as her consent [10, pp. 140–148;
13, p. 187; 14].
7 Or we could hold that the normative barrier to entering the person’s
private domain, since it was not lifted by her, is still in place. Which of these options
should we prefer? We should not assume without further examination that there is a
general answer to this question. The requirement of consent may sometimes still be
relevant, and sometimes not. Let me therefore consider, in good casuistic fashion, an
example of a situation in which the consent requirement is not relevant anymore and
then compare the organ removal case to it.
The notion of presumed consent is standardly used in medicine when it is
impossible to ask a patient for informed consent, for example, if a patient is
temporarily unconscious as a result of an accident. On the conception of consent I
have defended, the term is misleading, if not improper, for what we can presume is
not that authorization has actually been given, but at best, only that it would have
been given if the person had been able to make a decision. Hence, what we really
mean by presumed consent is that medical decisions in such cases should be guided
by the best interests of the patient, and in particular, that we should understand her
6 It is doubtful whether this really is what the survey results shows: people may combine a generally
favourable attitude with individual doubts and hesitations [12, §4].
7 Feinberg calls evidence of a person’s wishes a ‘‘consent surrogate.’’
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example, in the case of many patients, the mere chance of survival in a severely
handicapped mental state will not justify keeping them alive in a persistent
vegetative state). But we should not say that in making such judgments, we are
exercising her right to make decisions about her own body in her place. Nor should
we say that such judgements override her right to make decisions. Rather, the right
itself should be understood in such a way that it does not stand in the way of such
judgments. The right could, for example, be taken to mean that we should not
initiate any medical treatment without the patient’s consent if he is able to give it
competently.
If something like this is the proper speciﬁcation of the right, could not we argue
in a similar way that the postmortem removal—under proper conditions—of organs
for transplantation without the deceased’s consent is fully compatible with the
requirement of consent and the right from which it follows? The justiﬁcation of
introducing an opt-out system could then take the following form: the available
evidence suggests that in the majority of cases in which no decision of the deceased
has been registered, it is in his best interests to have his organs taken out for
transplantation. We will often err in acting on that assumption, but we will more
often err in acting on the contrary assumption. And by aiming to act on the best
interests of the deceased we do not contravene his authority, for being dead, he can
no longer exercise it.
This line of reasoning would still leave us with a burden of proof that may be
hard to meet in actual cases.
8 Research has shown that the very fact that people do
not register any decision tends to reveal an attitude of either indifference or
ambivalence.
9 If that is true, we will not increase the probability of fulﬁlling their
wishes by removing their organs. But let us suppose that we will in a particular case.
Is it then open to us to follow this line of reasoning?
A suggestive difference: Does Volenti hold?
I believe there are a number of signiﬁcant differences that make it doubtful whether
we can argue in similar ways in both the emergency and the organ removal cases. I
will start by pointing out a difference that exists even when the will of the patient
has been expressed in an authoritative way. Consider the emergency case: even if
the patient has given permission, in a legally binding document, to be treated under
the circumstances that presently obtain, he has not provided necessarily a sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for treating him. On our usual (albeit increasingly contested)
8 Actually, if we are trying to maximize interest satisfaction, we should not only consider the number of
cases in which our assumptions are mistaken or not, but if they are, also the extent to which they are
mistaken, i.e., the weight of the interests involved. Do we harm people to the same extent if we take their
organs against their wishes or if we do not take them? Another complicating factor is that people’s
welfare interests may not be identical with the fulﬁlment of their actual wishes: these wishes should
perhaps be ‘‘laundered’’ in some way. These very complications may be part of the rationale for leaving
the authority to decide with the agent.
9 See [8, §4] for a summary and references.
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that are actually harmful to the patient by appealing to the patient’s consent. In this
domain, the maxim volenti non ﬁt iniuria (no injury is done to a person who
consents) has only a limited validity. But if a decision to donate is made in a
competent way, no one ever has any qualms about applying the Volenti principle
whatsoever.
10
As for the emergency case, if a person’s survival is at stake, we have reason to be
very cautious in judging that survival will be harmful if she does not think so
herself; this is so because of the extent to which such judgments depend on personal
values. In the next section, this will turn out to be a highly relevant consideration
(cf. [17]). But if an advance directive requests a form of treatment which is not life-
prolonging and which, both in the personal judgment of the doctor and of the
‘‘professional standard,’’ is considered harmful to the patient, consent will not be
enough to justify treatment. This is also the case if treatment lengthens life only for
a short time, if the patient during that time will be in a state of severe suffering or if
the additional burdens caused by the treatment will be heavy.
We can point to the same difference between the two cases in the following way.
If a certain form of treatment is medically indicated and the patient consents to it, a
doctor has a professional duty to the patient to treat the patient in that way. If the
patient is unable to give consent, it is still a perfect duty. But if a person consents to
have her organs taken out for transplantation after her death, doctors have no duty,
at least no duty to her, to remove them [18]. And, a fortiori, they do not have that
duty if she dies without having made a decision.
I have started with this difference between the emergency case and the organ
removal case because it suggests other differences and obviously depends on them.
To identify these other differences, we could look in either of two directions, or in
both. In the emergency case, no actual consent of the patient is needed, because the
right to make decisions concerning treatment, which normally requires such
consent, is limited by the patient’s interest in being treated. So for a more basic
difference with the organ removal case, we can look either to the nature of the right
involved or of the interests limiting it. In fact, I believe we will ﬁnd relevant (and
related) differences on both sides.
The ﬁrst basic difference: The nature of the interests involved
Firstly, take the interests that are supposed to be limiting ones. In the emergency
case, these belong to a special category of interests that we could call basic needs:
survival, health, freedom from injury. The class of basic needs is notoriously
difﬁcult to demarcate, but there are clear cases on the side of both basic needs and
mere personal preferences. Emergency cases quite often concern clear cases of basic
needs. Indeed, it is because basic needs are at stake that health care is special, a
matter of social concern. But satisfying the personal preferences of a person is an
undertaking that we normally believe the person should take care of herself. This is
10 Cf. my discussion of the Volenti principle in [16].
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needs: people may sacriﬁce their health and even their lives for other priorities.
Rather, because these other priorities depend on the patient’s own values in a way
that makes them part of her identity as a person, we leave her to pursue them in her
own way and by her own lights. A person could not reveal, and perhaps not even
have, values if she did not pursue them in ways that involved making costly choices
(cf. [19, pp. 115–116]).
11 Most people would agree that providing, up to a certain
threshold, people with the all-purpose means (including health care) needed ‘‘to
subscribe to, to revise, and to actively pursue a conception of the good,’’ to use
Rawlsian phraseology, should be a social concern. But we leave it to them to pursue
their own conception of the good.
12
If people had the same kind of interests in having their organs taken or not taken as
they have in being treated or not treated in emergency cases, and if we could identify
the interests of the majority, I agree that we should act according to those interests, by
choosing our default accordingly to begin with. But although basic needs are at stake
in the organ removal case as well, they are other people’s basic needs, not our own.
Perhaps we have moral duties to help these needs to be met, if we can, but we cannot
say that it is in our own personal interest to fulﬁll them. Whether or not it is in our
interest fully depends on what we really care about. For most people who care about
donation, this care is not very central to the projects and relationships that determine
the personal value of their lives.
13 (Although it may be implied by the basic attitudes
they have towards life in general). Occasionally, it may be of great importance for a
person to be able to donate, for example, if she believes that this will be the only way
to redeem a wasted life. But in such a case it is still fully up to her to make up her own
mind and to take care of what she cares about.
14
The second basic difference: The nature of the right involved
My conclusion about interests is conﬁrmed when one considers the right. In the
emergency case the right involved—not to be treated without one’s own consent—is
an aspect of the inviolability of the body. Like many other rights, this should be
interpreted as a bundle of rights, powers, and/or immunities. One of those ‘‘atomic’’
rights, which is a constitutive element of the bundle, is an authority-right to decide
11 This is not inherently a deontological view; it can be shared by any kind of consequentialism which
values autonomy and/or allows for a moral division of labour.
12 Rawls famously argued that people are responsible for their ‘‘expensive tastes’’ [20, p. 94, 261–263,
423; 21]; see also [22, 23, Chap. 1]. But if one is able to change one’s religion because it becomes too
costly to satisfy its demands, one never was a believer in the ﬁrst place. It is not because people can
choose their values that we make them responsible for the costs involved in pursuing them.
13 This tends, of course, to be particularly true in the cases in which people fail to have registered a
decision. The weight of such (personal) interests is not great enough to make their satisfaction a matter of
social concern.
14 On this point, I disagree with David Price when he says that the neglected wish to donate is ‘‘no less a
wrong’’ to the deceased than the overridden wish to refuse donation [10, p. 147] In most cases it is a very
minor harm, and in all cases in which the harm is greater, it is open to the deceased to avoid it. Hence it is
never a wrong.
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inviolability, for in that case we would have no problems in allowing the Volenti
maxim to apply to it without any restrictions. Surely another ‘‘atomic’’ constituent
of the right is simply the correlate of other people’s duty not to cause bodily harm to
others.
15 The right is meant to protect others not only from a lack of recognition but
also from injury.
16 This protection is paradigmatically one of people’s basic needs.
And this explains why the right does not block even actions that harm the person
who bears that right, if these actions are necessary to prevent much greater harm to
her and if it is not feasible to consult her.
It is often supposed that the right to make decisions about our own dead bodies is
identical to the right to bodily integrity as it extends after our death [26]. In some
countries, this view even has legal status.
17 But T. M. Wilkinson has convincingly
argued that the view is implausible [27]. As he says, the right to bodily integrity is
one of our basic rights because we are embodied beings, but my dead body is no
longer an embodiment of ‘‘me.’’
It is plausible that we—living people of course, not dead ones—have the
authority-right to make some binding decisions concerning what will happen to our
bodies after our death. Indeed, that we have such rights is essential to my argument,
for if posthumous wrongs could not exist, it would not make sense to require the
consent of the deceased for the removal of his organs. Neither do I dispute the
possibility of posthumous harms. For example, some people have a preference for
their bodies to remain intact for some time after their death. However, this
preference cannot be compared to the interest in being free from injury during one’s
life. Injuries cause pain, suffering, and handicaps, but interfering with a dead body
causes neither of these harms. Any harm which it causes can only be a posthumous
harm, for example, by affecting the way the person will be remembered. Whether
people have such preferences is a highly contingent matter; it depends on their
general outlook on life, and certainly is not a matter of ‘‘basic needs.’’ If it were, it
would only be possible to meet it for a very short time.
Therefore, if there is any continuity between our right to bodily integrity and our
right concerning our dead body, it can only concern one particular atomic element
of the ﬁrst right (the authority-right), not the other element (the freedom from
injury). And because we should not take for granted without argument that this
authority-right has either the same scope or the same weight before and after death,
we should not make too much of the continuity either. Rather, one’s right to make
decisions about the destination of one’s own dead body should be seen as a right of
its own, only belonging to the general class of authority-rights, i.e., one’s body, even
one’s dead body, is preeminently one’s own—part of the private domain over which
15 On the long-standing discussion about the appropriateness of either a choice-theory or an interest-
theory of rights, my view is that there are rights, or elements of rights, of either class. For a classical
review of the discussion, see [24].
16 James Grifﬁn argues that the right not to be tortured protects our freedom to withhold information [25,
pp. 52–53], which is unconvincing for the same reason.
17 E.g., Germany and the Netherlands. The relevant article in the Dutch constitution (Art. 11) has been
introduced with this application in mind, and for some time, opt-out systems have therefore been rejected
as ‘‘unconstitutional.’’
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harm of disrespect. The prevention of that harm is a social concern, the prevention
of other possible harms involved is up to the individual.
Why is sex with an unconscious person impermissible if he or she did not
previously consent to it? One could use the emergency case as an analogy, and
argue that the reason is that people are less likely to want than not want to have sex
while unconscious, and that the ﬁrst want is also probably the strongest of the two.
But that does not seem to be the heart of the matter. Even if one had accidentally
come across some reliable evidence allowing one to assume that the person wished
to have sex while unconscious with someone like one (perhaps one accidentally
overheard a conversation between her and her psychiatrist), it would be rape to
actually have sex with her. Maybe it will do no harm to her welfare interests, but it
will still violate her rights, and thereby harm her interests in dignity.
It could be argued that no evidence can really be trusted in such cases: there is a
difference between having certain fantasies about possible cases and preferring
these fantasies to be actually enacted, and there even is a difference between having
a conditional preference and having an actual preference if the condition is satisﬁed.
But this is rather part (and surely no more than a part) of the explanation as to why
people have an authority-right concerning access to their body in the ﬁrst place, and
so it concedes the point I want to insist on: when consent can no longer be given,
nothing has changed to make it redundant.
I believe the same point generally applies to organ removal cases,
18 but its force is
strengthened in cases where it is feasible to ask for people’s consent while they are
alive. When this is feasible but has not been done, any appeal to our presumed
preferences after our death would be in a kind of bad faith. We might say, ‘‘we have
some reason to believe that she preferred to donate,’’ to which someone might ask,
‘‘well, why didn’t you ask her?’’ There is a strong suspicion that the answer wouldbe,
‘‘because you didn’t want to risk being shown to be wrong.’’ Here, we have a ﬁnal, if
only contingent, difference with the emergency case. In rich countries, it will
normally be feasible to make institutional arrangements, like a national donor
register, to enable people to register their decisions clearly and unambiguously. But it
is a very complicated affair to ﬁne-tune one’s living will in such a way that it takes
account of all possibly relevant circumstances of emergency. The absence of a living
will is rarely an indication that the agent did not care about the decision to be made in
an emergency or did not entertain conﬂicting considerations about it. For that reason,
we cannot say in the emergency case that if the person preferred to be treated, he
could have made this known in an advance directive. We need a default which, to the
best of our knowledge, represents most people’s actual interests in most actual cases.
Conclusion
In the section ‘‘A suggestive difference: Does Volenti hold?’’ I pointed out that
consent of the deceased is sufﬁcient to legitimize organ removal, but that even if
18 It certainly applies to living donation by incompetent people.
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on the other hand, consent is not enough to legitimize treatment, but if it is
required by the health interests of the patient, it is a professional duty owed to
him. In the two subsequent sections, I gave an explanation of these facts, in terms
of both the interests and the rights of the person involved. In the section on the
nature of the interests involved, I argued that the interests people may have in
donating or refusing to donate are personal preferences, not basic needs. Such
interests do not by themselves create duties for others. In the emergency case,
however, basic needs may be at stake, and in that case the doctor has a
professional duty of care for them. In the section on the nature of the right
involved, I argued that the right to make one’s own decisions about donation is an
authority-right that cannot be set aside by appeal to the deceased’s preferences,
however probable their ascription. The correlating duty for others is only to
respect the person’s authority, not to satisfy his preferences. If he requests aid, one
is allowed to provide it, on his authority. In the emergency case, however, the
professional duty of the doctor, correlating to the rights of the patient, is not only
to respect his authority but also to take care of his basic needs. If the patient has
not exercised his authority, the doctor should still do what his needs require. And
if the patient exercises his authority by requesting clearly harmful treatment, the
doctor’s duty not to harm should prevail.
If this is true, in deciding about removal of a person’s organs, all we need to do is
create sufﬁcient space for the person to make her own decisions, if we can do so
without excessive costs. We need not ourselves consider the interests she may have
in the fate of her mortal remains if she has been in a position to take care of these
interests herself. The only exception to this is her interest in her dead body being
treated with respect, an interest protected by a right she may not even be able to
waive. Such lack of proper respect, although it is not shown by removing organs
from a dead body by itself, can be shown by doing so without authorization. In
deciding about the removal of the deceased’s organs, if we respect his rights, we
have given his interests their full due.
In this article, I have only considered a possible justiﬁcation of opt-out systems
that seems promising at ﬁrst sight. The discussion has brought to light relevant
aspects of the interests and rights involved, which has been my main motive for
writing this article. Of course, the negative conclusion I have eventually arrived at
does not imply that opt-out systems cannot be defended. In fact my personal view is
that they are ethically superior. But the reason is not that they tend to promote the
best interests of people who die without having registered either consent or refusal
to having their organs removed.
Acknowledgment This article is the result of a discussion with Martin Wilkinson who had defended the
‘‘best interests’’ argument in a draft of a chapter of his book on organ donation, which will shortly be
published by Oxford University Press [11]. I am very grateful to him.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
268 G. den Hartogh
123References
1. Healy, K. 2006. Precious commodities: Do presumed consent laws raise organ procurement rates?
DePaul Law Review 55: 1017–1043.
2. Janssen, A., and S. Gevers. 2005. Explicit or presumed consent and organ donation post mortem:
Does it matter? Medicine and Law 24: 575–583.
3. Organ Donation Taskforce. 2008. Organs for transplants. United Kingdom: Department of Health.
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/
DH_082122. Accessed April 24, 2011.
4. Johnson, E.J., and D. Goldstein. 2004. Defaults and donation decisions. Transplantation 78:
1713–1716.
5. Johnson, E.J., and D. Goldstein. 2003. Do defaults save lives? Science 302: 1338–1339.
6. Thaler, R.H., and C.R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and hap-
piness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
7. Ullmann-Margalit, E. 1983. On presumption. Journal of Philosophy 80: 143–163.
8. den Hartogh, G. 2011. Can organ removal be justiﬁed by presumed consent? Journal of Applied
Philosophy. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00524.x.
9. den Hartogh, G. 2010. Tacitly consenting to donate one’s organs. Journal of Medical Ethics. doi:
10.1136/jme.2010.038463.
10. Price, David. 2009. Human tissue in transplantation and research: A model legal and ethical
donation framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Wilkinson, T.M. Forthcoming. Ethics and the acquisition of organs. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
12. den Hartogh, G. Forthcoming. The role of the relatives in opt-in systems of postmortal organ
procurement. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
13. Feinberg, J. 1986. Harm to self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Westen, P. 2004. The logic of consent: The diversity and deceptiveness of consent as a defense to
criminal conduct. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.
15. Harris, J. 2003. Organ procurement: Dead interests, living needs. Journal of Medical Ethics 29:
130–134.
16. den Hartogh, G. 2000. Euthanasia: Reﬂections on the Dutch discussion. In Medical ethics at the dawn
of the 21st century, ed. R. Cohen-Almagor, 174–187. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
17. Gampel, E. 2006. Does professional autonomy protect medical futility judgments? Bioethics 20:
92–104.
18. Wilkinson, T.M. 2005. Individual and family consent to organ and tissue donation: Is the current
position coherent? Journal of Medical Ethics 31: 587–590.
19. den Hartogh, G. 2000. Priorities in health care: Why the search for principles fails. In The good life as
a public good, ed. G. den Hartogh, 107–118. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
20. Rawls, J. 1971. Theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
21. Rawls, J. 1982. Social unity and primary goods. In Utilitarianism and beyond, ed. A. Sen and B.
Williams, 159–186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Scanlon, T.M. 1975. Preference and urgency. Journal of Philosophy 72: 655–669.
23. Dworkin, R.M. 2000. Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
24. Sumner, L.W. 1987. The moral foundations of rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
25. Grifﬁn, J. 2008. On human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Kluge, E.H. 2000. Improving organ donation rates: Various proposals and their ethical validity.
Health Care Analysis 8: 179–195.
27. Wilkinson, T.M. 2007. Individual and family decisions about organ donation. Journal of Applied
Philosophy 24: 26–40.
In the best interests of the deceased 269
123